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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
As argued below, this Court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of the bulk of
the issues presented on appeal; however, if the Court accepts jurisdiction over some or all of
the issues on appeal, the Court would have to rely on Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j) for
that jurisdiction.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The Hones are dissatisfied with Advanced Shoring's statement as it concerns the
appropriate standard of review for the first and second issues on appeal. These issues are
styled as denials of summary judgment and directed verdict, and indeed they are; however,
the first and second issues presented by Advanced Shoring have critical evidentiary
components that necessarily influence the level of scrutiny to be applied by this Court.
When a district court determines not to require expert testimony, the Court of Appeals
should review for abuse of discretion, not, as Advanced Shoring contends, for correctness.
"It is within the discretion of the trial court to determine the suitability of expert
testimony in a particular case, and we will not reverse that determination on appeal in the
absence of a clear showing of abuse." State v. Johnson, 2009 UT App 382, f 17, 224 P.3d
720, 725; see also Walker v. Union Pacific R. Co., 844 P.2d 335, 343 (Utah App. 1992).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
None.

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below
This is an action for breach of warranty. (R. 1.) Advanced Shoring moved for
summary judgment arguing that it did not give the Hones a warranty. (R. 22.) The Trial
Court denied the motion inasmuch as it found "certain areas of material fact, particularly
those relating to the alleged 'warranty,'" in dispute. (R. 33.) Advanced Shoring filed a
second motion for summary judgment, arguing (1) that the Hones could not meet their
burden of proof without an expert, and (2) that the Hones could not recover damages where
they no longer owned the home at issue. (R. 39.) "[T]he trial court again denied summary
judgment on both arguments because of the existence of unspecified material disputes of
fact." (Brief of Appellant at p. 4.)
At trial, Advanced Shoring argued all three of the issues it previously lost on
summary judgment in the form of a motion for directed verdict. Advanced Shoring's
motion for directed verdict was also denied. (R. 79 at pp. 114-140.) Advanced Shoring
renewed these same positions in its closing argument. (R. 80 at pp. 60-89.) The Hones,
after presenting substantial evidence, prevailed at trial on their breach of warranty and
contract claims (R. 80 at pp. 89-101.)
The Trial Court found that Advanced Shoring breached its warranty and contract,
stating, in part, as follows:
-

[T]he court was stricken powerfully by what Mrs. Hone has described as the
fateful call. I have been doing this - 1 have been in the trial courtrooms of the
State of Utah for an excess of 36 years now. I was particularly struck after all the
thousands of witnesses that I have listened to and examined myself and cross
examined myself of the clarity with which Mrs. Hone testified. I note that clarity
2

in comparison to the failure to recall on the part of Mr. Garside. Mrs. Hone was
absolutely crystal clear, "I cannot guarantee this project unless I receive another
$10,000." (R. 80 at pp. 91:19-92:3.)
-

Therefore, the recitation by Mr. Garside that he did not recall ever making a
statement like that seems to be substantially outweighed by the actions and the
testimony of Mrs. Hone and the subsequent actions of Mr. Boyack, and the
payment of the check for $8743. The Court specifically finds that upon payment
of that check that a warranty was bought. There's no question in my mind that a
warranty was purchased. That is further supported by the behavior of the parties
after that event. Additional work that was not billed by Advanced Shoring was
conducted beyond the work of November of 2006. Advanced Shoring went back
to the project in the summer of 2007 and began the additional work. No
statements were sent for that additional work. (R. 80 at pp. 92:12-24.)

-

It is clear to the Court that Advanced Shoring was operating under the
assumption that there was a warranty .... (R. 80 at pp. 92:25 - 93:1.)

-

My other findings are based upon a preponderance of this - of the evidence, but
as to this warranty, again, I reemphasize the experience of this trial judge, my
experience in the trial courtrooms of this state, and the absolute clarity and
overpowering weight of the testimony of Mrs. Hone regarding this conversation.
I am clearly convinced as to the extension of the offer for warranty and the
acceptance thereby through payment of the additional check. (R. 80 at pp. 94:29.)

-

[T]he departure of the defendant from the project is unexplained and must be laid
squarely at the feet of Advanced Shoring. The Court can only find that they
voluntarily left the project. (R. 95 at pp. 95:1-4.)

-

Was the contract breached? Well, it was breached because the brackets were not
installed and the work was stopped. (R. 80 at pp. 95:12-13.)
Statement of the Facts

The Hones built a home in LaVerkin, Utah in 2004. (R. 27 at pp. 1-2.) The home
experienced substantial settling. (R. 27 at pp. 1-2.) The Hones hired Advanced Shoring to
repair the home. (R. 27 at pp. 3-4.) Advanced Shoring was unable to repair the home. (R.
27 at p. 6.) Advanced Shoring informed the Hones that additional materials and work were
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necessary for Advanced Shoring to guarantee its work. (R. 44 at p. 3.) Advanced Shoring
stated "I won't guarantee it unless I get $10,000 more." (R. 27 at p. 5.) Advanced Shoring
proposed to perform additional work and offered a guarantee that no additional settling of
the home would occur, in exchange for the additional $105000. (R. 44 at p. 3; R. 27 at pp. 56.) The Hones received, and paid, an invoice1 from Advanced Shoring for the warranty and
accompanying work in the amount of $8,7432. (R. 44 at p. 3.) Advanced Shoring
acknowledges that Lana Hone's intent in paying additional monies was that Advanced
Shoring would "'fix the house, we will never have any problems with it again, he can secure
it. There won't be any sinking. There won't be any cracks. It will be good as new.' (R. 22 at
p. 5.) Advanced Shoring assured the Hones it could fix the house. (R. 44 at pp. 5-6.)
Advanced Shoring guaranteed that the Hones' home would no longer settle after it
installed helical piers. (R. 44 at p. 4.)
The Hones' home continued to settle after Advanced Shoring installed the helical
piers. (R. 44 at p. 5.) Advanced Shoring was unable to stabilize the foundation of the
home. (R. 27 at p. 6.) Advanced Shoring returned to the home to attempt to stabilize the
home. (R. 27 at pp. 6-7.) When its additional attempts to stabilize the home failed,
Advanced Shoring claims that the Hones refused to allow Advanced Shoring to return to the
1

At some places in the summary judgment record the parties state that an additional
$8,000 was paid. The actual amount invoiced and paid was $8,743 (R. 44 at p. 3) and
any references in the summary judgment record to $8,000 are best read as estimates.
Though the $8,743 payment is less than the amount of $10,000, Advanced Shoring did
not argue that the Hones did not pay full value for the warranty. After offering a
warranty for $10,000, Advanced Shoring sent an invoice in the amount of $8,743, which
the Hones paid. (R. 44 at p. 3.) There was no controversy at trial, or on summary
judgment, about the amount paid.
4
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home to perform further work. (R. 22 at p. vii; R. 27 at p. 6.) After Advanced Shoring
stopped working on the house, the house continued to sink. (R. 44 at p. 6.) When
Advanced Shoring started work on the house, just the Southwest comer of the home was
sinking; after Advanced Shoring stopped working, the entire house was damaged,
sinking, and caving in toward the middle of house. (R. 44 at p. 6.) Some of the piers
installed inside the home came up through the floor. (R. 44 at p. 6.)
After Advanced Shoring had come out the third time to work on the Hones' house
Per Danfors of Advanced Shoring came to the house; Mr. Danfors said to Michael Hone
that he didn't realize the house was so bad, that he couldn't afford to fix it, and that he
would turn it over to his insurance company. (R. 44 at p. 4.) Mr. Danfors told Michael
Hone he had spoken to his attorney who told him he should not have guaranteed the work
on the house. (R. 44 at p. 4.) Mr. Danfors let the Hones know that Advanced Shoring
would not be able to come out to the house again and would not be able to fix the settling
problem. (R. 44 at p. 4.)
Advanced Shoring came to work on the Hones' home three times; on each of these
occasions, Advanced Shoring caused damage to the property; every time they came the
damage to the home got worse - they damaged the inside and the outside of the home.
(R. 44 at pp. 4-5.) While Advanced Shoring was working on the Hones' home, they
caused damages, including but not limit to the following:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

Damage to decorative curbing
Damage to lawn and sprinkling system
Damage to front stamped concrete sidewalk
Damage to patio
Punched holes through stucco and exterior walls
5

f.
g.
h.
i.
j.
k.
1.
m.

Damaged rain gutters
Destroyed landscaping
Punctured interior water line twice
Damaged interior tile
Damage to interior paint
Left general debris and dirt in home
Damage to carpet
Damage to house foundation

(R. 44 at p. 5.) The Hones incurred tens-of-thousands of dollars in costs to fix the
problems caused by Advanced Shoring's work. (R. 44 at p. 5.)
At trial, Derek Imlay, the Director of Operations and a former building inspector
for the City of La Verkin, testified that he lifted the certificate of occupancy for the home
because of safety issues relating the settling of the home. (R. 79 at pp. 31-33.) For
illustrative purposes, the Hones have attached, as Addendum A, a sampling of trial
exhibit photographs demonstrating the damage to the home. (R. 78 at p. 81, Ex. 8, 9, 17,
18, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 33, 36, 37, 41, 53, 61, and 84.)
When it became apparent that Advanced Shoring could not fix the house, the
Hones realized they would lose their home; their lender started foreclosure proceedings.
(R. 44 at p. 6.) The Hones could not afford to have a deficiency judgment against them,
so they decided to file bankruptcy before their house was sold at foreclosure. (R. 44 at p.
6.) The Hones' home was sold at a trustee's sale on February 25, 2010. (R. 44 at p. 4.)
The Hones filed bankruptcy because they had to pay tens-of-thousands of dollars to fix
the damage caused to the property by Advanced Shoring, they had to vacate the home
because it was not safe, and they could no longer afford to pay both the mortgage
payment and rent required for a different place to live. (R. 44 at p. 5.) The Hones had
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initially planned on filing for Chapter 13 bankruptcy, but around the time they were
planning to file, Michael Hone was injured and lost his income; because of Michael
Hone's lost income the Hones filed for Chapter 7 instead of Chapter 13. (R. 44 at p. 6.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Advanced Shoring now seeks to appeal its losses on two motions for summary
judgment. These motions were denied because the Trial Court determined that it could not
render summary judgment in light of material factual disputes. Advanced Shoring later
made its same summary judgment arguments at trial, and again lost. The Hones cannot
definitively say why Advanced Shoring has chosen to appeal its losses on summary
judgment instead of appealing the outcome at trial; but the obvious guess is that Advanced
Shoring did not believe it could meet its heavy burden of attacking the Trial Court's factual
record, which came out strongly in the Hones favor. To that end, Advanced Shoring now
seeks to attempt an "end run" on the facts that were developed at trial by ignoring them, and
asking this Court to review legal issues that were not outcome determinative. Regardless of
whether the Hones' suspicions as to Advanced Shoring's motives are correct, the fact
remains that the posture of Advanced Shoring's appeal is procedurally improper.
The Utah Supreme Court recently held that an appeal from the denial of a summary
judgment motion is only appropriate if the motion were denied on a "purely legaF basis.
Normandeau v. Hanson Equipment, Inc., 2009 UT 44, H 15, 215 P.3d 152, 157. In the
instant case, the Trial Court denied Advanced Shoring's motions because of factual
disputes, and Advanced Shoring's trial arguments were in no way prejudiced by the denials
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of summary judgment; therefore, the Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the denials of summary judgment at issue in the present appeal.
Advanced Shoring also appeals its lost motion for directed verdict. Advanced
Shoring has failed to even make an attempt to marshal evidence, as is required for such an
appeal, which would support the Trial Court's denial of directed verdict. Accordingly
Advanced Shoring's appeal should, and can, be dismissed on that basis alone. Additionally,
this Court should note that while the failure to marshal evidence is fatal to Advanced
Shoring's position, Advanced Shoring must also necessarily lose because Advanced
Shoring cannot demonstrate the Hones failed to present evidence upon which a reasonable
trier of fact could render a verdict in the Hones' favor.
Advanced Shoring argues that the Hones should have been required to present expert
testimony at trial. Simply stated, expert testimony is unnecessary for a reasonable trier of
fact to find breach of a warranty. Advanced Shoring guaranteed that it would fix the house
and stop it from settling. Given the open and obvious devastation the home suffered any
reasonable person, including the Hones, would be more than capable of testifying that the
Hones'home was not fixed, did not stop settling, and was uninhabitable. No complex
geotechnical analysis was necessary for the Hones to prove the breach. This is especially
true where the City of LaVerkin deemed the home uninhabitable, and the Hones were
forced to move out - the home was obviously not repaired as promised by the warranty.
Advanced Shoring seeks to escape responsibility by arguing that it cannot be
responsible for the damages suffered by the Hones because they lost the home through
foreclosure. This position is directly contrary to controlling Utah law. Specifically, the
8

Supreme Court of Utah has held that a property owner may recover damages for
construction defects even if he or she no longer owns the home. See Mitchell v. Stewart,
581 P.2d 564 (Utah 1978). Furthermore, the Hones alleged at the time of summary
judgment that Advanced Shoring was the direct cause of their loss of the home to
foreclosure because of the extensive out-of-pocket expenses the Hones incurred while trying
to repair the home after Advanced Shoring performed work and because the home was
unlivable and the Hones could not afford to pay their mortgage in addition to a rental
payment. Accordingly, Utah case law and issues of material fact both prevented summary
judgment on this issue.
Finally, Advanced Shoring argues that the terms of the warranty at issue were too
indefinite to be enforceable. The Trial Court expressly denied this argument because
"certain areas of material fact, particularly those relating to the alleged 'warranty,9 remain
in dispute ...." (R. 33.) Advanced Shoring admits informing the Hones that additional
work would be required to stop the home from settling and admits stating "I won't
guarantee it unless I get $10,000 more." The Supreme Court has held that whether a
statement constitutes a warranty is a question for the trier of fact. Groen v. Tri-O-Inc,
667 P.2d 598, 606 (Utah 1983). In this instance the meaning and intention behind the
statement "I won't guarantee it unless I get $ 10,000 more" was precisely the factual
question the Trial Court identified in denying the motion for summary judgment. Later, at
trial, the Trial Court found the warranty was sufficiently definite. Specifically, the
warranty required Advanced Shoring to repair the home and stop it from further settling.
At a bare minimum, given the standard at summary judgment, this issue is one where its
9

ambiguous nature requires the trier of fact to review the facts and circumstances to
appropriately interpret the warranty at issue.
ARGUMENT
I.

ADVANCED SHORING DOES NOT HAVE A BASIS TO APPEAL THE
DENIALS OF ITS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
DIRECTED VERDICT.
a. This Court can only review denials of summary judgment rendered on
purely legal grounds; Advanced Shoring's motions for summary
judgment were not denied on purely legal grounds.
The Supreme Court of Utah has held that "when a court denies a motion for

summary judgment on a purely legal basis, that is where the court denies the motion
based on the undisputed facts, rather than because of the existence of a disputed material
fact, the party denied summary judgment may challenge that denial on appeal."
Normandeau v. Hanson Equipment, Inc., 2009 UT 44, % 15, 215 P.3d 152, 157. "On
appeal, we will review a district court's denial of a summary judgment motion when the
district court makes a legal ruling based on undisputed facts that do not materially change
at trial." Id. at f 9. The Supreme Court announced these holdings to clarify prior case
law on the subject of the appellate review of denials of summary judgment. Id. at % 8.
The previous standard for reviewing the denial of a summary judgment motion was stated
in Wayment v. Howard, 2006 UT 56, H 20, 144 P.3d 1147, 1151-52 (emphasis in
original):
In appealing a summary judgment ruling, only facts and legal
theories that were foreclosed from being addressed at trial
may be heard on appeal. Even if the motions had been
granted, the interlocutory nature of a partial summary
judgment leaves them subject to modification by the trial court
10

up until entry of final judgment. Appellant was accorded the
opportunity to fully litigate his case. Consequently, the trial
court's initial denials of partial summary judgment resulted in
no prejudice, did not affect the final outcome, and are not
reviewable.
The Normandeau Court considered implementing a bright line rule precluding any
review of a denial of summary judgment, but ultimately determined that the courts may
need to review summary judgment denials where, in light of a district court's denial of
summary judgment on a legal basis, it would be futile for the moving party to continue to
litigate the issue upon which it had lost at summary judgment. Normandeau, 2009 UT
44, Tfl] 9-16. The Court cited to Estate Landscape & Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. v.
Mountain States Tel & Tel Co., 844 P.2d 322 (Utah 1992), in which the district court
denied a summary judgment motion concerning accord and satisfaction as a matter of law.
Id. at H 12. "In that case, it would have been futile for the losing party to litigate accord
and satisfaction at trial due to the earlier court ruling; no factual issue at trial would have
affected the legal determination." Id. The Normandeau Court also cited to Prince,
Yeates & Geldzahler v. Young, 2004 UT 26, 94 P.3d 179, in which Prince Yeates sought
summary judgment, arguing that, as a matter of law, no contract existed between the
parties to that case. Id. at 1) 13. Prince Yeates was not foreclosed from arguing that there
was no contract between the parties, but because the district court had already ruled that a
contract existed, such an argument would have been futile and Prince Yeates was entitled
to appellate review. Id. atfflf13-14.
In the instant matter however, Advanced Shoring's appeal is improper because its
motions were not denied on a "purely legal" basis. Advanced Shoring sought relief
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through summary judgment for each of the three issues it now appeals in the present matter.
As to each of these issues, the Trial Court denied summary judgment on the basis that there
existed material disputes of fact. Advanced Shoring can point to no legal ruling from the
Trial Court which rendered any of its arguments futile at trial. In fact, all of those arguments
were vigorously asserted at trial, and renewed as part of a motion for directed verdict and in
the Advanced Shoring's case in chief.
Advanced Shoring's first motion for summary judgment, which sought relief on the
basis that Advanced Shoring did not offer a warranty, was submitted on or about November
30,2009. (R. 21.) The Trial Court found that "certain areas of material fact, particularly
those relating to the alleged 'warranty,' remain in dispute." (R. 33.) Because of these
material disputes of fact, the Trial Court held that summary judgment was not appropriate,
and denied the motion on the basis of the factual disputes. (R. 33.) Advanced Shoring's
motion for summary judgment as to the existence of the warranty was expressly denied on a
factual basis.
As will be argued extensively below, numerous issues of fact prevented the Trial
Court from granting Advanced Shoring's first motion for summary judgment. Specifically,
the parties disputed the intent of Advanced Shoring in stating "I won't guarantee it unless I
get $10,000 more." The Hones contend that Advanced Shoring intended to offer a
warranty, and Advanced Shoring contended it did not. (See R. 27 at p. 6.) Advanced
Shoring, in its Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (R. 22 at
p. 5), acknowledges that Lana Hone's intent in paying additional monies was that Advanced
Shoring would "'fix the house, we will never have any problems with it again, he can secure
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it. There won't be any sinking. There won't be any cracks. It will be good as new.' (Dep. of
LanaHoneat 130:22-131:1; 107:18-108:15)."
Advanced Shoring's second summary judgment motion, filed on or about September
3,2010, requested relief on the other two issues in its appeal: namely, that the Hones could
not prevail on their case without expert testimony, and that the Hones could not recover
because they no longer owned the home. This motion fared no better, and was denied by
the Trial Court. Advanced Shoring admits that "the trial court again denied summary
judgment on both arguments because of the existence of unspecified material disputes of
fact." (Appellant's Brief; p. 4.)
Disputes of fact prevented summary judgment on the second motion as it concerns
the necessity of expert testimony. The Hones presented facts on summary judgment that
they bought a warranty from Advanced Shoring to keep their home from continued
settlement, and that Advanced Shoring did not successfully stop the home from settling. (R.
44.) The primary factual dispute on this issue dealt with the intent of the parties and
whether the Hones paid additional compensation just for work and labor, or whether they
were purchasing a warranty. The Hones argue that because they purchased a warranty, this
is primarily a case about breach of warranty and expert testimony is unnecessary.
As to the third issue on appeal, whether the Hones can recover damages for a home
they no longer own, the record again demonstrates a factual dispute preventing summary
judgment. The Hones would not have had to file bankruptcy and lose their home in
foreclosure if Advanced Shoring had performed and honored its warranty. (See R. 44.)
When it became apparent that Advanced Shoring could not fix the house, the Hones realized
13

they would lose their home. (R. 44 at p. 6.) The pending foreclosure on the Hones' home
necessitated that the Hones file for bankruptcy protection to avoid a deficiency judgment
being taken against them. (R. 44 at p. 6.) Advanced Shoring argued that the Hones'
bankruptcy filings indicated that they had filed bankruptcy because they suffered a
reduction in income after Mr. Hone became disabled and that they could not later claim they
were filing bankruptcy because of anything Advanced Shoring did. (R. 51.) While true that
the Hones' bankruptcy filing identified Mr. Hone's disability and loss of income as a reason
for the bankruptcy filing, that does not change the fact that the Hones were forced into
bankruptcy because Advanced Shoring did not honor its warranty. Because the facts
concerning the reasons for the bankruptcy filing, and whether Advanced Shoring caused the
Hones to file bankruptcy were in dispute, the Trial Court properly denied Advanced
Shoring's motion for summary judgment on this issue as well.
Where the Trial Court denied Advanced Shoring's motions for factual disputes, it is
hard to imagine that this Court can determine that the denials were on "purely legal" bases.
Advanced Shoring is asking this Court to second guess the Trial Court's reasoning in
denying these motions. Such is not the role of the Appellate Court. The Trial Court ruled
that the motions were denied for factual reasons, but Advanced Shoring now argues that this
Court should conclude that the Trial Court actually denied the motions on different grounds
than those stated by the Trial Court. If the Court allows Advanced Shoring to appeal the
denials of its motions, which were denied for factual reasons, and in light of the factual
disputes set forth above, the Court is essentially saying that any denial of a summary
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judgment motion is appealable. Such a proposition would be contradictory to the
Normandeau directive that only denials on "purely legal" bases are appealable.
Advanced Shoring raised its summary judgment arguments at trial, on directed
verdict, (R. 79 at pp. 114-125), and in its closing arguments, (R. 80 at pp. 57-89). Unlike
the losing parties in Estate Landscape and Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler, it was not futile
for Advanced Shoring to argue its summary judgment issues at trial. Where the Trial
Court did not expressly deny the motions for a legal basis, Advanced Shoring was in no
way impaired in bringing its summary judgment arguments again at trial. Where there is
no specific pre-trial ruling which would render a trial argument futile, it is irrelevant if
the motions were denied for factual reasons or for legal reasons. Therefore, Advanced
Shoring is in a dissimilar position to the appellants in Estate Landscape and Prince,
Yeates & Geldzahler. The Court should decline to take jurisdiction over the denials of
summary judgment, or alternatively, if the Court does take jurisdiction, it should affirm
the denials of Advanced Shoring's summary judgment motions.
b. The Court should affirm the denials of summary judgment because
Advanced Shoring failed to marshal evidence which would support the
Trial Court's findings of factual disputes.
A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that
supports the challenged finding. Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(9). Though
Advanced Shoring attempts to evade this requirement by framing its entire argument in a
way that the Court will only review the Trial Court's decisions for legal correctness, its
argument, in actuality, challenges the factual determinations of the Trial Court. The Trial
Court expressly denied Advanced Shoring's first motion for summary judgment in light of
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factual disputes, stating that "certain areas of material fact, particularly those relating to the
alleged 'warranty/ remain in dispute." (R. 33.) As to its second motion for summary
judgment, Advanced Shoring admits that "the trial court again denied summary judgment
on both arguments because of the existence of unspecified material disputes of fact."
(Appellant's Brief at p. 4.) A district court's finding that material facts are in dispute, thus
preventing summary judgment, is a "fact finding" within the scope of Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure 24(a)(9).
To marshal evidence, '"[cjounsel must extricate himself or herself from the client's
shoes and fully assume the adversary's position. In order to properly discharge the duty
of marshaling the evidence, the challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious
order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced ... which supports the very findings
the appellant resists. After constructing this magnificent array of supporting evidence,
the challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence. The gravity of this flaw must
be sufficient to convince the appellate court that the court's finding resting upon the
evidence is clearly erroneous.'" State v. Willey, 2011 UT App 23, If 11, 248 P.3d 1014,
1018 (emphasis in original) (quoting Kimball v. Kimball, 2009 UT App 233, % 21, 217
P.3d 733 (citations and internal quotations omitted)). Appellants cannot shift the burden
of marshaling by falsely claiming that there is no evidence in support of the trial court's
findings. Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, H 78, 100 P.3d 1177, 1195 (citing Wilson Supply,
Inc. v. Fraden Mfg., 2002 UT 94, \ 22, 54 P.3d 1177). Marshaling is required to promote
efficiency and fairness. Id. at % 79 (citing Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage &
Warehouse Inc., 872 P.2d 1051, 1054 (Utah App. 1994)). It would be unfair to require
16

the appellee to marshal evidence at considerable time and expense because appellants
bear a greater burden on appeal. Id. (citing Oneida, 872 P.2d at 1053-1054). An
appellant must marshal all evidence which would support the challenged decision in its
opening brief. Harding v. Bell, 2002 UT 108, D 21, n. 3, 57 P.3d 1093.
"If the marshaling requirement is not met, the appellate court has grounds to
affirm the court's findings on that basis alone." Chen, 2004 UT 82 at ^f 80 (citing Wilson
Supply, Inc., 2002 UT 94 at f 26). "If appellants have failed to properly marshal the
evidence, we assume that the evidence supports the trial court's findings." Id. (citing
Utah Med. Prods., Inc. v. Searcy, 958 P.2d 228, 233 (Utah 1998)). "In the face of an
appellant's failure to properly marshal the evidence, our most likely action is summary
affirmance of the challenged trial court decision." Neely v. Bennett, 2002 UT App 189, \
11,51 P.3d 724 (citing Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exck, 817 P.2d 789, 800 (Utah 1991)).
In order to properly challenge the Trial Court's rulings on summary judgment,
where the Trial Court found material facts in dispute as the basis for its denial of the
motions, Advanced Shoring is required to marshal all evidence that might support the
findings that factual issues were in dispute at the time of summary judgment. Advanced
Shoring is required to set forth each possible fact that might have been considered by the
Trial Court as being in dispute. After setting forth all possible factual disputes, the
burden would then have been on Advanced Shoring to explain why no dispute actually
existed. Advanced Shoring's failure to marshal evidence supporting the Trial Court's
finding of factual disputes is fatal to its appellate effort; therefore, this Court should
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summarily affirm the Trial Court's denial of the summary judgment motions. To
emphasize this point, the Hones direct the Court to Chen v. Stewart:
"Even where the defendants purport to challenge only the legal ruling,... if a
determination of the correctness of a court's application of a legal standard is extremely
fact-sensitive, the defendants also have a duty to marshal the evidence." Chen, 2004 UT
82 at % 20. In Chen, the former president, Chen, of a family corporation, E. Excel,
brought a derivative suit against the corporation and its president, Stewart. Id. at ^ 7.
The district court entered a preliminary injunction against Stewart and other third-party
defendants. Id. at % 16. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that even though it was
being asked to review the legal correctness of issues surrounding the preliminary
injunction, these determinations were so fact-sensitive that the appellants were required
to marshal evidence. Id. at ^ 20. Specifically, the Court stated that the appellant should
have marshaled evidence because it asked the Court to "call into question the factual
findings of the trial court." Id. at ^] 81, n. 15. Rather than marshal the evidence, the
appellants in Chen "merely ignored damaging findings and avoided confronting
problematic facts by claiming that there is 'no evidence.'" Id. at ^ 83.
Advanced Shoring's appeal is nearly identical in its posture, and similar to the
appeal in Chen, requires that the Appellate Court review factual findings of the Trial
Court. Review of the denials of Advanced Shoring's motions necessarily requires this
Court to decide whether the Trial Court's findings of factual dispute were proper.
Advanced Shoring seeks to hide from the marshaling requirement by downplaying the
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Trial Court's findings of factual dispute. Specifically, Advanced Shoring states that the
Trial Court's rulings "were based entirely on undisputed facts ...." (Appellant's Brief at
p. 8.) Advanced Shoring, like the appellant's in Chen, tries to avoid damaging factual
issues and simply claims that, despite the Trial Court's rulings, no actual disputes of fact
existed. Even if the Court construes the determination of whether there are disputed
material facts to somehow be legal in nature, it is impossible to ignore that such a review
would be highly fact sensitive, and hence under Chen Advanced Shoring is still required
to marshal evidence.
In addition to the Chen analysis, is the Utah Court of Appeals decision that an
appellant challenging a ruling on directed verdict is required to marshal evidence, and then
show why the evidence was insufficient for the court to deny the motion. Neely, 2002 UT
App 189 at ^] 11. Advanced Shoring fails to meet this directive as well. Specifically,
Advanced Shoring appeals the Trial Court's denial of its motion for directed verdict on the
basis that the Hones should have presented expert testimony. The clear reasoning from
Neely applies to Advanced Shoring's motion for directed verdict. Hence, because
Advanced Shoring has failed to comply with controlling case law, has failed to marshal the
evidence, and has failed to point out the "fatal flaw" in that evidence this Court should not
consider Advanced Shoring's appeal of the denial of the directed verdict motion.
It is of course relevant that the denial of a directed verdict motion is highly analogous
to the denial of a summary judgment motion on the basis that a factual dispute exists. A
motion for directed verdict is denied if the evidence presented by the claimant is insufficient
to support a verdict. Id. \ 14. Summary judgment is properly denied if there is a genuine
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issue as to any material fact. U.R.C.P. 56(c). An appeal in each instance requires the
Appellate Court to review the factual record in full. One of the reasons marshaling is
required is to put the burden on the appellant to develop and analyze the full factual record
at issue. See e.g. Wilson Supply, Inc., 2002 UT 94 at H 21. This Court should require an
appellant to marshal evidence both when appealing a denial of a directed verdict motion,
and when appealing the denial of a summary judgment motion where the Trial Court has
based its denial on disputed facts.
II.

EXPERT TESTIMONY IS NOT REQUIRED FOR THE HONES TO PROVE
THEIR BREACH OF WARRANTY CLAIM.
Advanced Shoring argues the Trial Court erred in denying their summary judgment

motion, and their motion for directed verdict, on the basis that the Hones could not prevail
on their claims without an expert. Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law." Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c). An appellate court, when
reviewing a district court's decision on summary judgment, views all facts and
reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of the non-moving party. Massey v. Griffiths,
2007 UT 10, H 8, 152 P.3d 312, 313 (internal quotations and citations omitted). The
Court of Appeals will affirm the denial of a motion for summary judgment as long as it is
possible that a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.
Christiansen v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 2006 UT App 180, U 6, 136 P.3d 1266, 1269
(citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)).
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Denial of a directed verdict is reversed "only if, viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prevailing party, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to
support the verdict." Brewer v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R., 2001 UT 77,1) 33, 31
P.3d 557, 569 (internal quotations and citations omitted). "In other words, demonstrating
insufficiency of the evidence requires an appealing party to show that all the evidence in
favor of the verdict cannot support the verdict." Id. (internal quotations and citations
omitted). Furthermore, at the directed verdict stage, the court is not permitted to weigh
the evidence, but must only determine whether there is a question of material fact for the
jury to consider. Young v. Fire Ins. Exch., 2008 UT App 114, \ 34, 182 P.3d 911,919
(internal quotations and citations omitted). Thus, when there is at least some competent
evidence that would support a denial of a verdict, then a directed verdict is inappropriate.
Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
a. The district court has discretion to determine if expert testimony is
necessary, and a determination that expert testimony is unnecessary is
reviewed for abuse of discretion.
Advanced Shoring asks the Court to review for correctness the denial of its
motions asserting that the Hones should be required to present expert testimony.
Correctness is not the appropriate standard of review on this issue. Evidentiary rulings
are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Weiser v. Union Pacific R.R.
Co., 2010 UT 4, H 22, 247 P.3d 357, 365. Trial courts enjoy broad discretion in
determining whether expert scientific evidence is admissible. Brewer, 2001 UT 77 at H
16 (internal citations omitted). Admission of expert testimony is within the discretion of
the trial court. State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 332 (Utah 1991). The decision to exclude the
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testimony of an expert witness is a matter uniquely within the province of the trial court,
and will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. Walker, 844 P.2d at 343. "It
is within the discretion of the trial court to determine the suitability of expert testimony in
a particular case, and we will not reverse that determination on appeal in the absence of a
clear showing of abuse." Johnson, 2009 UT App 382 at ^[17 (citing State v. Larsen, 828
P.2d 487, 492 (Utah App. 1992)). "[I]f scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." Utah Rules of
Evidence 702(a).
The Trial Court denied Advanced Shoring's requests that the Hones be required to
present expert testimony in this case in order to prevail. The decision not to require
expert testimony is an evidentiary ruling in the same way that rulings to allow or to
exclude expert testimony are evidentiary. Such rulings are well within the discretion of
the district courts.
Rule 702(a) provides that "if" scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact, expert testimony "may" be allowed. The district court is left
to make the threshold decision of "if' such testimony will assist the trier of fact - a
decision the court makes in its own discretion. Even if such testimony would assist the
trier of fact, expert testimony is still not mandatory; it "may" be allowed - again, at the
discretion of the court.
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b. Expert testimony is only required in limited circumstances.
Expert testimony is unnecessary where the propriety of the defendant's conduct is
within the common knowledge and experience of the layman. Preston & Chambers, P.C.
v. Koller, 943 P.2d 260, 263-264 (Utah App. 1997) (internal quotations and citations
omitted). In Young v. Fire Insurance Exchange, the Plaintiffs home and personal items
were damaged by fire. 2008 UT App 114 at \ 3. The Plaintiff filed a claim against the
insurance company for the loss. Id. As per the policy terms and conditions the company
initiated compensation protocols and issued repeated payments. Id. However, after an
investigation into the fire concluded, the fire was possibly the result of arson, the
insurance payments ceased. Id. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed suit alleging breach of
contract. Id. The defendant moved for, and was granted, a directed verdict at the trial
level because the Plaintiff allegedly failed to satisfy the burden of proof with expert
testimony that the loss was not the result of arson. Id. at ^f 17. On appeal this Court
reversed the trial court's directed verdict and held an expert was unnecessary to survive a
directed verdict because the loss caused by fire is a topic within the grasps of ordinary
people and a jury. Id. at ^ 33.
Expert testimony is most commonly required in medical malpractice cases. See
Nguyen v. IHCHealth Servs. Inc., 2010 UT App 85, H 15, 232 P.3d 529, 536 (finding
that the standard of care could not be proved in a medical malpractice claim without
expert testimony); Young, 2008 UT App 114 at H 32 (explaining that expert testimony is
usually required to establish proximate cause in medical malpractice cases, but the
common knowledge principle creates an exception to the general requirement (internal
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quotations and citations omitted)); Sohm v. Dixie Eye Center, 2007 UT App 235, % 15,
166 P.3d 614, 619 ("Because of the complex issues involved in a ... medical malpractice
case, the plaintiff is required to prove the standard of care and proximate cause through
expert testimony" (internal quotations and citations omitted)). In the majority of medical
malpractice cases the plaintiff must introduce expert testimony to establish standard of
care. Nixdorfv. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 352 (Utah 1980). However, even in the ultracomplicated medical malpractice arena, expert testimony is not required where a layman
can conclude the impropriety of the treatment at issue. Id. (internal citations omitted).
"Whether a surgical operation was unskillfiilly or skillfully performed is a scientific
question. If, however, a surgeon should lose the instrument with which he operates in the
incision . . . , it would seem as a matter of common sense that scientific opinion could
throw little light on the subject." Id. (quoting Fredrickson v. Maw, 119 Utah 385 (1951)).
The Hones' claims are obviously simpler to sort out than medical malpractice claims, and
much like leaving a surgical instrument in an incision, scientific opinion would shed little
light on the question of whether Advanced Shoring breached its warranty by failing to
repair a home that was so ruined, the certificate of occupancy was removed by LaVerkin
City. Unlike medical malpractice and other cases involving highly complex issues of
causation, a breach of warranty case does not require expert testimony.
c. Expert testimony was not necessary to prove the Hones' breach of
warranty claim.
Pointedly expressed, expert testimony is not necessary for the Hones to know that
their house was cracking, sinking into the earth, and collapsing around them. Advanced
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Shoring's argument wrongly assumes that the Hones had to prove that Advanced Shoring's
geotechnical work was deficient. There is no complex geotechnical analysis involved in
determining (1) that the Hones bought a warranty from Advanced Shoring, (2) that the
warranty required Advanced Shoring to repair the home and stop it from settling, and (3)
that Advanced Shoring did not repair the home and did not stop it from settling. Whether
the house was repaired and whether it continued to settle are simple observations that can be
made by a homeowner.
Additionally on the summary judgment record, the Hones set forth the following
factual statements, which must be viewed in the light most favorable to them (R. 44 at pp. 36.):
-

Plaintiffs affirmatively state that Advanced Shoring informed Plaintiffs that the
additional materials and work were necessary in order for Advanced Shoring to
guarantee its work.
,-•

-

After Advanced Shoring had come out the third time to work on Plaintiffs'
house Per Danfors came to the house. Mr. Danforth said to Michael Hone that
he didn't realize the house was so bad, that he couldn't afford to fix it, and that
he would turn it over to his insurance company.

-

Mr. Danforth let Plaintiffs know that Advanced Shoring would not be able to
come out to the house again and would not be able to fix the settling problem. .

-

Subsequently, Mr. Danfors told Michael Hone he had spoken to his attorney
who told him he should not have guaranteed the work on the house.

-

Advanced Shoring guaranteed that Plaintiffs' home would no longer settle after
they installed helical piers.

-

Plaintiffs' home continued to settle after Advanced Shoring installed the
helical piers.

-

Advanced Shoring assured Plaintiffs they could fix the house.
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-

After Advanced Shoring stopped working on the house, the house continued to
sink.

-

When Advanced Shoring started work on the house, just the Southwest corner
of the home was sinking; after Advanced Shoring stopped working, the entire
house was damaged, sinking, and caving in toward the middle of house.

The factual record on summary judgment demonstrates that the Hones purchased a
warranty from Advanced Shoring to keep their home from continued settlement. The
Hones paid substantial consideration for this warranty. When Advanced Shoring did not
successfully stop the home from settling, and did not compensate the Hones for its failure,
Advanced Shoring was in breach of the warranty. The reasons why Advanced Shoring's
work was unsuccessful are irrelevant to this conclusion. Where the Hones were able to give
testimony that their home continued to settle after they bought the warranty, no expert
testimony was needed.
The practical result of adopting Advanced Shoring's argument is that obvious and
readily apparent injuries will be withheld from the trier of fact unless a claimant can bear the
expense, time, and delay of engaging an expert witness. Advanced Shoring's position
would require expert testimony in all kinds of cases where such testimony has not
previously been required. This is hardly helpful to the economy ofjudicial process and is
wholly unnecessary. Further, and contrary to Advanced Shoring's position, the notion that
Advanced Shoring's work may have been technical in nature is not the basis of the Hones'
breach of warranty claim - the basis of the claim is that a certain result was promised and
paid for, and Advanced Shoring did not achieve that result. Simply put, a result was
guaranteed and not achieved; hence the breach.
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d. The Hones established a prima facie case, and the Trial Court properly
denied summary judgment.
On a motion for summary judgment, or a motion for directed verdict, where the
moving party requests dismissal of a claim on the basis that expert testimony is required to
prove causation, the court evaluates whether the non-moving party can establish a prima
facie case without an expert. See e.g. Young, 2008 UT App 114 at H^] 29-24; Thurston v.
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, 2003 UT App 438, f 6, 83 P.3d 391, 392. In Young,
the Court of Appeals reversed the grant of directed verdict where the plaintiff had
established a prima facie case for liability. Young, 2008 UT App 114 at ^ 34. Young sued
Fire Insurance Exchange ("FIE") when it did not pay on a claim that Young's home was
destroyed by fire; FIE asserted that the fire was a result of arson and would not pay. Id. at
<|flf 3-4. At trial, Young's expert testimony was excluded. Id. atfflf15-17. The district court
held that Young had not established a basis upon which to submit the matter to the jury, and
granted a motion for directed verdict. Id. at If 17. The Court of Appeals reversed, stating
that Young was not required to present expert testimony to establish a prima facie case. Id.
at Tf 29. Because Young had established a prima facie case, she should have survived
summary judgment, because she presented some competent evidence that would support a
verdict in her favor. Id. at If 34.
Like Young, the Hones presented a prima facie case of breach of warranty.
Advanced Shoring warranted that it would fix the Hones' home and keep it from settling.
Advanced Shoring did not fix the home and it continued to settle. The Hones therefore
meet the necessary elements for a breach of warranty claim, and did not need expert
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testimony to survive summary judgment or directed verdict. The Trial Court properly
denied the motions and referred the issue of causation to the trier of fact.
In Thurston, the parents of a disabled man claimed the man's medical staff was
negligent and proximately caused their son's death. 2003 UT App 438, \ 6. The Court held
that summary judgment for the defendants was appropriate because the plaintiffs were
unable to offer evidence linking the suicide of their Son with the negligence of the care
givers. Id. at % 20. It was not the lack of an expert which made summary judgment
appropriate; rather, it was the lack of any evidence to support the proximate cause of the
man's death. Id atfflf12-22. Proximate cause was left to conjecture. Id. at ^ 13. The trial
court does not ordinarily determine proximate cause as a matter of law, unless there is no
evidence to support causation. Id. at ^[ 15-16. Had the Thurston plaintiffs been able to
demonstrate a prima facie case of causation, they would have survived summary judgment.
Unlike the Thurston plaintiffs, the Hones have submitted prima facie evidence that
Advanced Shoring offered a warranty and failed to live up to that warranty, and it would be
error for the Trial Court to have determined that the Hones could not prove causation at trial
in light of its evidence.
The notion that causation is not determined as a matter of law is especially true in a
breach of warranty action. "[UJnlike a cause of action in negligence, which is premised on
fault, a cause of action for breach of express warranty sounds in strict liability." SME Indus.,
Inc. v. Thompson, Ventulett, StainbackandAssocs., Inc., 2001 UT 54, If 18, 28 P.3d 669,
676 (internal citations omitted). A plaintiff is not required to prove causation in strict
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liability. See e.g. Decius v. Action Collection Serv., Inc., 2004 UT App 484, ^ 16, 105
P.3d 956, 960 (u[S]trict liability permits a plaintiff to forgo proving causation ....").
III.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED ADVANCED SHORING'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO THE HONES' DAMAGES
EVEN THOUGH THE HONES NO LONGER OWNED THE HOME.
a. A property owner may recover damages for injury to property even
though he or she no longer owns the property.
The Supreme Court of Utah has held that a property owner may recover damages for

construction defects even if he or she no longer owns the home. See Mitchell v. Stewart,
581 P.2d 564 (Utah 1978). In Mitchell, the plaintiffs bought a home which was built by the
defendants. Id. at 564. After they sold the home, the plaintiffs brought an action against the
defendants for damages from defective construction. Id. at 564-565. Similar to Advanced
Shoring, the defendants in that case moved to dismiss on the basis that the plaintiffs no
longer owned the home. Id. at 564. The Supreme Court reasoned that the defendants'
motion to dismiss was not well taken, because "If they suffered compensable damage, it
would make no difference whether or not they still owned the house." Id. at 564-565.
Though not the focus of its decision, the Court of Appeals supported the Mitchell
holding in a footnote in 2006, stating, "It should be noted that if Plaintiffs had suffered
any compensable damage, their lack of a present ownership interest in the [property]
would not preclude recovery." Eleopulos v. McFarland and Hullinger, LLC, 2006 UT
App 352, H 16 n. 5, 145 P.3d 1157, 1160. Thus, the only criterion for the Hones to meet
under the Mitchell standard is to have "suffered compensable damage" - an inquiry
which has nothing to do with present ownership of the home.
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Advanced Shoring admits in its Brief that the trial court denied Advanced
Shoring's second motion for summary judgment "because of the existence of unspecified
material disputes of fact." (Brief of Appellant, p. 4.) Advanced Shoring now appeals
that decision, alleging that the parties agreed as to the central facts applicable to the
issues. (Brief of Appellant, p. 4.) Clearly, this is not the case. In response to Advanced
Shoring's motion for summary judgment, the Hones disputed many of Advanced
Shoring's statements of allegedly undisputed facts and asserted the following damages in
their Additional Statements of Fact (R. 44 at pp. 4-6):
-

Advanced Shoring guaranteed that Plaintiffs' home would no longer settle after
they installed helical piers.

-

Plaintiffs' home continued to settle after Advanced Shoring installed the
helical piers.

-

After Advanced Shoring stopped working on the house, the house continued to
sink.

-

When Advanced Shoring started work on the house, just the Southwest corner
of the home was sinking; after Advanced Shoring stopped working, the entire
house was damaged, sinking, and caving in toward the middle of house.

-

Advanced Shoring came to work on Plaintiffs' home three times. On each of
these occasions, Advanced Shoring caused damage to the property. Every time
they came the damage to the home got worse - they damaged the inside and
the outside of the home.

-

While Advanced Shoring was working on Plaintiffs' home, they caused
damages, including but not limit to the following:
a. Damage to decorative curbing
b. Damage to lawn and sprinkling system
c. Damage to front stamped concrete sidewalk
d. Damage to patio
e. Punched holes through stucco and exterior walls
f. Damaged rain gutters
g. Destroyed landscaping
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h.
i.
j.
k.
1.
m.

Punctured interior water line twice
Damaged interior tile
Damage to interior paint
Left general debris and dirt in home
Damage to carpet
Damage to house foundation

-

Plaintiffs incurred tens-of-thousands of dollars in costs to fix the problems
caused by Advanced Shoring's work.

-

Some of the piers installed inside the home came up through the floor.

The Hones quite obviously asserted that they suffered damages. In a reply
memorandum, Advanced Shoring objected to each statement of additional fact stated
above and moved to strike them from the record (R. 51); the motion was denied (see
Minute Entry of 12-14-10, Addendum D to Appellant's Brief). It is clear that the parties
did not agree as to the central facts as Advanced Shoring now claims. In light of the
parties' dispute as to the material facts of the case, the Trial Court properly denied
Advanced Shoring's motion for summary judgment. Inasmuch as they properly asserted
claims for compensable damages, the fact that the Hones no longer owned the home
during the time of trial is irrelevant to the denial of summary judgment.
Advanced Shoring attempts to differentiate the case at hand from Mitchell on the
basis that the Mitchell home was sold by the homeowners and the Hones' home was sold
at a trustee's sale. Nothing in the Mitchell decision limits the Court's holding to apply only
to property owners who personally sell their property or makes an exception if there is a
cessation of ownership due to foreclosure. Rather, Mitchell makes an unqualified statement
that if a plaintiff "suffered compensable damage, it would make no difference whether or
not they still owned the house." 581 P.2d at 564.
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As an additional matter, it would be bad public policy to allow a wrongdoer to avoid
liability merely because a victim of wrongdoing is no longer in possession of the injured
property. Wrongdoing parties should not be allowed to serendipitously escape
responsibility for their bad acts.
b. Whether Advanced Shoring caused the Hones' bankruptcy and the
foreclosure is a question of fact reserved for trial.
When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, "'[a] trial court is not
authorized to weigh facts.. .but is only to determine whether a dispute of material fact
exists.5" Barenbrugge v. State, 2007 UT App 263, f 7, 167 P.3d 549 (quoting Pigs Gun
Club, Inc. v. Sanpete County, 2002 UT 17, f 24, 42 P.3d 379). Causation, however, is a
question of fact that must be determined by an examination of the facts. See Kilpatrick v.
Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283, 1292 (Utah App. 1996) (finding that "[cjausation i s
a highly fact-sensitive element of any cause of action" and that summary judgment is
appropriate "only if there is no evidence upon which a reasonable jury could infer
causation" (internal quotations omitted)). Because causation is a fact-sensitive issue, it is
not easily disposed of on summary judgment. See Kilpatrick, 909 P.2d at 1292.
As Advanced Shoring stated in the Brief of Appellant, the Trial Court denied
Advanced Shoring's second motion for summary judgment "because of the existence of
unspecified material disputes of fact." (Brief of Appellant, p. 4.) Regarding the
foreclosure of the home and the Hones' bankruptcy proceeding, Advanced Shoring
asserted, among others, the following allegations of fact in its motion for summary
judgment:
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-

Beginning in June, 2009, Plaintiffs defaulted on the Promissory Note by failing
to make required monthly payments. Notice of Default and Election to Sell the
Property was filed by the holder of the Deed of Trust (hereinafter, "Creditor")
on or about August 25, 2009.

-

Documents filed with the bankruptcy court indicate that Plaintiffs filed for
bankruptcy protection because they were no longer able to satisfy their
obligations to numerous creditors. Additionally, Plaintiffs represented to the
United States Trustee that Mr. Hone's inability to continue working after
suffering a blood clot in his leg reduced Plaintiffs [sic] income substantially.

-

Creditor then initiated a non-judicial foreclosure, which was completed by
issuance of a trustee's deed on or about March 8, 2010. This trustee's deed
transferred title to the Property to a buyer who purchased the Property at a
trustee's sale. Any interest Plaintiffs had in the Property was extinguished by
foreclosure.

(R. 39 at pp. vii-ix.)
In response, the Hones disputed many of the allegedly undisputed facts as stated
by Advanced Shoring. The Hones also made the following assertions from which a
reasonable jury could infer that Advanced Shoring's actions caused the Hones to file for
bankruptcy and caused their home to be lost to foreclosure:
-

Plaintiffs home was sold at a trustee's sale for $ 151,900 on February 25, 2010.

-

Plaintiffs paid tens-of-thousands of dollars in costs to fix the problems caused
by Advanced Shoring's work.

-

Plaintiffs filed bankruptcy because they had to pay tens-of-thousands of dollars
to fix the damage caused to the property by Advanced Shoring, they had to
vacate the home because it was not safe, and they could no longer afford to pay
both the mortgage payment and rent.

-

When it became apparent that Advanced Shoring could not fix the house,
Plaintiffs realized they would lose their home.

-

Plaintiffs could not afford to have a deficiency judgment against them, so they
decided to file for Chapter 13 bankruptcy, but around the time they were
planning to file, Michael Hone was injured and lost his income.
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-

Because of Michael Hone's lost income Plaintiffs filed for Chapter 7 instead of
Chapter 13.

(R. 44 at pp. 4-6, Additional Statements of Fact.)
Advanced Shoring argues that the Hones' bankruptcy and foreclosure were "based
on decisions unrelated to Advanced Shoring's conduct." (Brief of Appellant, p. 23.) The
Hones, however, have asserted that they had no choice but to file for bankruptcy because
they had paid tens-of-thousands of dollars to fix the damage caused to the property by
Advanced Shoring, because they were required to vacate the home because it was
uninhabitable, and because they could no longer afford to pay both the mortgage payment
and rent. From the facts alleged by the Hones, a reasonable jury could infer that
Advanced Shoring caused the Hones to file for bankruptcy and to lose their home to
foreclosure. Summary judgment is appropriate only if there is no evidence upon which a
reasonable jury could infer causation. Because a reasonably jury could infer causation in
this matter, denial of summary judgment was proper.
c. The Hones damages were not limited to being dispossessed of the home.
Advanced Shoring's appeal incorrectly casts the Hones' damages as being related to
only the loss of the home.
Under Utah law it is well established that the injured party in
a breach of contract action has a right to damages based
upon his expectation interest as measured by (a) the loss in
value to him of the other party's performance caused by its
failure or deficiency, plus (b) any other loss, including
incidental or consequential loss, caused by the breach, less
(c) any cost or loss that he has avoided by not having to
perform.
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TruGreen Cos., LLC

v. Mower Bros., Inc., 2008 UT 81, K 10, 199 P.3d 929, 931.

Advanced Shoring's motion for summary judgment did not take into account
damages for reimbursement of the Hones' out-of-pocket costs incurred in repairing the
injury Advanced Shoring caused to the house. Upon summary judgment, the Hones
asserted that their damages were related not only to the loss of their home but also extended
to their out-of-pocket costs of repairing the injury caused by Advanced Shoring. (R. 44 at
pp. 4-6.) The Hones prevailed at trial on both categories of damages: (1) loss of value to
the home, and (2) reimbursement of expenses incurred by the Hones to repair injury to the
home caused by Advanced Shoring. (R. 80 at pp. 98-100.) On summary judgment, the
Trial Court was asked to rule that the Hones could not recover any damages because they no
longer owned the home. (R. 39.) Based on the Hones claimed damages for out-of-pocket
expenses, the Trial Court, even if it had been compelled by Advanced Shoring's argument
as concerning the loss of the home, properly denied the motion as it could not ascertain, as a
matter of law, that no damages were appropriate.
IV,

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED ADVANCED SHORING'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE ISSUE OF WARRANTY.
Advanced Shoring challenges the Trial Court's denial of its summary judgment

motion arguing that the Hones' warranty was unenforceable. The Trial Court ruled on
summary judgment that "certain areas of material fact, particularly those relating to the
alleged'warranty,'remain in dispute ...." (R. 33.)
Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah
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Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c). An appellate court, when reviewing a district court's
decision on summary judgment, views all facts and reasonable inferences therefrom in
favor of the non-moving party. Massey, 2007 UT 10 at U 8. The Court of Appeals will
affirm the denial of a motion for summary judgment as long as it is possible that a fairminded jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Christiansen, 2006 UT App
180 at H 6 (citing Anderson, 411 U.S. 242).
a. Where there are disputed facts, an oral warranty cannot be interpreted
on summary judgment.
Summary judgment cannot be granted where there exist genuine issues of material
fact. Lovendahl v. Jordan School Dist, 2002 UT 130,1) 13, 63 P.3d 705, 709. Only the
trier of fact can ascertain the intent of the parties to an oral agreement. See e.g. Rex T.
Fuhriman, Inc. v. Jarrell, 445 P.2d 136, 137 (Utah 1968) (stating, "It was the duty of the
trial court in its interpretation of this oral agreement to ascertain the meaning to be given
to the words and manifestations of the parties and thus determine their intention") (citing
Restatement of the Law of Contracts, §226, p. 305, and comment b). Where there is
conflicting evidence, whether a statement constitutes a warranty is a question for the trier of
fact. Groen v. Tri-O-Inc, 667 P.2d 598, 606 (Utah 1983); Park v. Moorman
Manufacturing Co., 241 P.2d 914, 918 (Utah 1952); Nielson v. Hermansen, 166 P.2d
536, 538 (Utah 1946). The Groen Court additionally went to the effort to distinguish the
interpretation of an oral warranty, which is a factual interpretation, from the interpretation of
an unambiguous written contract, which interpretation can be made as a matter of law. 667
P.2dat606.
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Advanced Shoring concedes that it made the statement "I won't guarantee it unless I
get $10,000 more." The parties further agree that the Hones paid additional compensation
after this statement was made. The major factual dispute hinges on the intent of the parties.
The Hones intended to buy a warranty. Advanced Shoring claims it did not intend to give a
warranty.
Specifically, the Hones, in their Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment (R. 27 at p. 6) set forth their dispute to Advanced Shoring's
eighteenth factual statement as follows:
18. Plaintiffs authorized Advanced Shoring to perform additional work, and paid
$8,000.00 to cover the additional cost. (Dep. of Lana Hone at 97:2-16.)
Plaintiffs do not dispute that they paid an additional $8,000.00, but this
additional cost was not only for the additional work, but also to secure a
guarantee of the work performed insuring that no additional settling of the
home would occur, (Dep. of Lana Hone 96:12-97:18, Dep. of Michael Hone
97:1-14.)
This dispute, which speaks to the intent of the Hones in paying additional monies, is enough
to defeat Advanced Shoring's motion. The Hones paid additional monies to secure
Advanced Shoring's guarantee that it could stop any additional settling of the home from
occurring.
Advanced Shoring, in its Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment (R. 22 at p. 5), acknowledges that Lana Hone's intent in paying additional monies
was that Advanced Shoring would "'fix the house, we will never have any problems with it
again, he can secure it. There won't be any sinking. There won't be any cracks. It will be
good as new.' (Dep. of Lana Hone at 130:22-131:1; 107:18-108:15)." This is clearly a
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dispute as to what was meant by Advanced Shoring's statement, "I won't guarantee it unless
I get $10,000 more", which dispute should have been, and in fact was, resolved at trial.
b. The statement "I won't guarantee it unless I get $10,000 more" is not the
sole basis for the warranty.
The Court should note that Advanced Shoring's framing of this argument is based on
a faulty premise. Advanced Shoring asks the Court to determine that the statement "I won't
guarantee it unless I get $10,000 more", standing alone, cannot create an enforceable
warranty. This statement, however, is not the sole basis for the warranty. In addition to this
statement, the summary judgment record contains other facts - facts which Advanced
Shoring failed to marshal - which are critical in determining whether a reasonable trier of
fact could conclude Advanced Shoring gave the Hones a warranty.
The parties agree that Advanced Shoring stated "I won't guarantee it unless I get
$10,000 more." The parties agree that additional monies were paid. (R. 27 at p. 6.) The
parties further agree that, after payment of the additional monies, Advanced Shoring
returned to the home to perform additional work, but was unable to stabilize the home. (R.
27 at p. 6.) Advanced Shoring returned to the home to perform work, not once, but at least
twice (R. 27 at pp. 6-7), and claims to have wanted to come back to perform more work, but
states that "Plaintiffs have refused to allow Advanced Shoring to return to the Property."
(R. 22 at p. vii.)
Advanced Shoring offered a warranty, and the Hones bought it. After money
changed hands, the course of conduct of the parties is further evidence of the warranty.
Acting in all consistency with the idea that it had given the Hones a warranty, Advanced
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Shoring came to the home for further work, and when the Hones still had problems,
Advanced Shoring came back for an additional attempt to fix the home. When the home
continued to settled thereafter, Advanced Shoring claims to have wanted to come back to
make another attempt, but claims it was prevented by the Hones from so doing.
Advanced Shoring might contend that it came back to the home merely because the
Hones paid for additional labor, but this ignores the fact that Advanced Shoring came back
to the home on multiple occasions, and it claims to have wanted to come back to do even
more work, but was prevented by the Hones. Advanced Shoring acted as though it thought
it had warranted a particular result on the project.
c. The warranty was sufficiently definite for the Trial Court to deny
summary judgment
"Express warranties presuppose that the parties have entered into some kind of
contractual agreement, and arise out of promises by the warrantor guaranteeing or
assuring a specific result." SMEIndus., Inc., 2001 UT 54 at ^ 18. A warranty is an
assurance by one party to a contract of the existence of a fact upon which the other party
may rely. Groen, 667 P.2d at 604. It is intended to relieve the promisee of any duty to
ascertain the fact for himself, and it amounts to a promise to answer in damages for any
injury proximately caused if the fact warranted proves untrue. See Quagliana v.
Exquisite Home Builders, Inc., 538 P.2d 301, 309 (Utah 1975); Welchman v. Wood, 353
P.2d 165, 167 (Utah 1960).
Utah case law also establishes that an express warranty does not require any
particular words to be effective. See Welchman, 353 P.2d at 328; Nielson, 166 P.2d at
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537; Rockhill v. Creer, 189 P. 668, 671 (Utah 1920). "[T]he representation of fact which
would naturally tend to and does induce a bargain is a warranty." Nielson, 166 P.2d at
537. A warranty only requires a direct and positive affirmation of fact made by the
warrantor guaranteeing a result. SMEIndus., Inc., 2001 UT 54 at % 21. Where there is
indefiniteness, there is no contract. Candland v. Oldroyd, 248 P. 1101, 1102 (Utah 1926).
"A condition precedent to the enforcement of any contract is that there be a meeting of
the minds of the parties, which must be spelled out, either expressly or impliedly, with
sufficient definiteness to be enforced." Valcarce v. Bitters, 362 P.2d 427, 428 (Utah
1961).
Advanced Shoring guaranteed that the Hone's home would not settle any further,
on the condition that the Hones pay additional monies. This representation by Advanced
Shoring induced the Hones to pay the additional monies. Advanced Shoring, therefore,
assured that if it was unable to secure the home, it would answer in damages. Advanced
Shoring's representation was an affirmation that, for additional consideration, it could
guarantee the security of the home. Advanced Shoring gave the Hones a warranty.
In Groen, the Supreme Court found that there was enough evidence that the
question of whether the defendant gave the plaintiff a warranty should have been
submitted to the trier of fact. 667 P.2d at 606. Plaintiff was to perform complicated
helicopter work, known as "flying wire." Id. at 600. Defendant gave plaintiff certain
rope to "fly wire" and when the plaintiff expressed concerns about the rope, the
defendant assured him that the rope was strong enough. Id. at 600-601. The defendant's
statements were sufficient to raise issues of fact and should have been submitted to the
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jury for determination of whether the statements constituted a warranty. Id. at 606.
Similarly, the Hones argue that Advanced Shoring offered them a warranty. Whether the
parties intended to exchange a warranty for additional consideration is not a question that
can be resolved on summary judgment, and was properly submitted to the trier of fact.
Welchman is a warranty case in which the district court dismissed the plaintiffs'
case before evidence was submitted to the jury. 353 P.2d at 166. On appeal the plaintiffs
asked the Supreme Court to reverse the district court ruling in light of the plaintiffs'
evidence of the existence of a warranty. Id. at 167. The plaintiffs had listed their home
for sale with the defendant acting as its agent at an asking price of $21,000. Id. at 166. A
couple named Granger offered to exchange their home, valued at $10,000, for the
plaintiffs' home and to pay the balance of the purchase price over time. Id. at 166-167.
The plaintiffs needed cash and could not accept this offer. Id. at 167. In order to push
the transaction through, the defendant represented that it would it would assist the
plaintiff in securing an FHA loan and in selling the Granger installment contract, so the
plaintiffs could get cash out of the transaction. Id. The defendant stated, "I will see that
you get that loan", and "I will sell your contract for no less than $4,000, whereby you can
attain your money." Id. Defendant did not obtain the loan and did not sell the contract.
Id. The Court found that the statements made by the defendant were enough to submit to
the trier of fact and reversed the district court's ruling. Id. at 168. The representations
made by Advanced Shoring are similar to those in Welchman. Advanced Shoring's offer
to guarantee its work induced reliance by the Hones in the same way that the defendant's
statements induced the reliance of the plaintiffs in Welchman.
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In Valcarce, the parties, mink ranchers, negotiated the sale of 180 mink. 362 P.2d
at 428. The buyer gave $1,500 cash and a promissory note for $2,700. Id. The buyer
attempted to argue that the sale price of the mink was $1,500 and that he gave the
promissory note for some other side deal. Id. The buyer argued that the note was given
for one of three possible deals: (a) for the seller to give an unspecified number of
additional mink; (b) to be applied on a transaction where the seller would ranch some of
his mink on the buyer's ranch; or (c) to return the note to the buyer. Id. The Court
concluded that because the "plaintiff himself could not delineate with any definiteness"
which of the three deals the parties had agreed to, it could not enforce a contract. Id. The
warranty in the case at hand is nothing like the contract in Valcarce. Where in Valcarce,
the plaintiff could not even articulate what his promissory note was for, naturally, the
Court could not find a contract. The Hones, quite specifically, state that they bought a
warranty from Advanced Shoring so that their home would stop sinking. Even Advanced
Shoring admits that it stated "I won't guarantee it unless I get $10,000 more." Advanced
Shoring's representations induced the Hones to pay additional consideration. When
Advanced Shoring gave the Hones this warranty it promised to answer in damages if it
was unable to secure the home.
To reverse the Trial Court's ruling on summary judgment, this Court, while making
all inferences in favor of the Hones, would have to find that a reasonable trier of fact could
not have found that the parties agreed to a warranty. This is an especially difficult standard
where an experienced trial judge, a more-than-competent trier of fact, has reviewed the
evidence and found that such a warranty did in fact exist. A reasonable trier of fact could
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find that Advanced Shoring meant to give the Hones a warranty when it stated "I won't
guarantee it unless I get $10,000 more."
Advanced Shoring acknowledges making the statement "I won't guarantee it unless I
get $10,000 more." The reasonable inference of this statement is that Advanced Shoring
actually intended to guarantee its work in exchange for $10,000. The summary judgment
record also contains Lana Hone's deposition testimony concerning her intent in paying
additional consideration, namely that Advanced Shoring would "fix the house, we will
never have any problems with it again, he can secure it. There won't be any sinking. There
won't be any cracks. It will be good as new." (R. 22 at p. 5.) A trier of fact could
reasonably conclude that Lana Hone's interpretation of the warranty is correct.
Advanced Shoring cites the Court to Harris v. Albrecht, 2004 UT 13, 86 P.3d 728.
In Harris, a business owner filed suit after his building burned down. Id, at H 6. The
business owner alleged that he had called his insurance agent and asked him to place fire
coverage on his equipment and the content of his office. Id, at % 5. The agent allegedly said
"he would take care of [it]" and "he would come out and look at [the] equipment," but the
agent did not obtain any insurance. Id, at ^fl| 5-6. The Court found no contract between the
parties. Id, at ^| 10. Harris is very different from the present case. After the business owner
and the agent discussed potential fire coverage, neither party took any further action toward
obtaining fire insurance. Id, at ^ 14. After Advanced Shoring offered the Hones a
warranty, the Hones paid consideration for the warranty. No evidence is cited in Harris that
the business owner paid for fire coverage. After the Hones paid consideration, Advanced
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Shoring came to the Hones' home to attempt to secure it; when its attempt failed, Advanced
Shoring came back for another attempt; when that attempt failed, Advanced Shoring claims
it wanted to return again, but was prevented by the Hones. There was no evidence in Harris
that the conduct of the parties to that case indicated insurance had been purchased. The
Hones and Advanced Shoring both acted as if the offered-and-paid-for warranty was in
effect.
Brown fs Shoe Fit Co, v. Olch, 955 P.2d 357 (Utah App. 1998) is also set forth by
Advanced Shoring as similar to the present case. A critical distinction between Olch and
the present case is that the parties in Olch could not identify the amount to be paid under the
contract at issue. Id. at 364. No such problem exists for the Hones, where the price of the
warranty is not contested by the parties - only whether the price paid was for the purchase
of a warranty.
d. Where contract terms are missing, the contract is ambiguous, not
indefinite.
Much of Advanced Shoring's argument focuses on terms that it considers absent
or unclear from the warranty. The Hones contend that the warranty is completely
developed, but even if that were not true, the warranty is, at worst, ambiguous. While a
lack of definiteness is demonstrated when there is no "meeting of the minds," see
Valcarce, 362 P.2d at 428, ambiguity is a condition where the parties have had a meeting
of the minds sufficient to demonstrate that some agreement exists, or may exist, but the
terms are missing or have uncertain meaning, see WebBank v. American General Annuity
Service Corp., 2002 UT 88,1ffl 19-20, 54 P.3d 1139, 1145. If there is any lack of clarity
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to the terms of the warranty, the warranty should be construed as ambiguous, not
indefinite.
An appellate court reviews the trial court's legal conclusion that the contract is
ambiguous for correctness. Nielsen v. Gold's Gym, 2003 UT 37, H 6, 78 P.3d 600, 601
(citing Parduhn v. Bennett, 2002 UT 93, H 5, 61 P.3d 982). If a contract is deemed
ambiguous, and the trial court allows extrinsic evidence of intent, interpretation of the
contract becomes a factual matter and the court's review is strictly limited. Id. (citing
Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985)). "An ambiguity exists in a contract
term or provision if it is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation because of
uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or other fecial deficiencies."
WebBank, 2002 UT 88 at ^ 20 (internal quotations and citations omitted). When
ambiguity exists, the intent of the parties becomes a question of fact. Plateau Mining Co.
v. Utah Div. of State Lands & Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990). "Failure to
resolve an ambiguity by determining the parties' intent from parol evidence is error." Id.
"[A] motion for summary judgment may not be granted if a legal conclusion is reached
that an ambiguity exists in the contract and there is a factual issue as to what the parties
intended." Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 1983). Because an
ambiguous contract must be referred to the trier of fact for interpretation, the Trial Court,
to the extent the warranty is ambiguous, properly denied summary judgment.
Advanced Shoring relies on Gold's Gym to make its argument that the warranty at
issue is indefinite, but Gold's Gym is really a case about ambiguity and "more a case about
missing terms than indefinite terms." Gold's Gym, 2003 UT 37 at ^ 10. This case
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highlights the distinction and relationship between ambiguity and indefiniteness. Gold's
Gym was a dispute between a commercial landlord and tenant. Id. at % 1. The parties
disagreed about which of them was responsible for improvements to the building. Id. at ^ 4.
The parties had entered into a lease agreement, but the agreement was silent as to who was
responsible for the improvements. Id. at ^] 3. The district court made the threshold
conclusion that the contract was ambiguous and allowed extrinsic evidence of the parties'
intent. Id at ^S. After considering extrinsic evidence the trial court found that there was no
meeting of the minds and dismissed the complaint for indefiniteness. Id. at ^ 5. Nielsen
appealed the trial court's conclusion that the lease agreement was ambiguous. Id. at % 11.
The Supreme Court affirmed the determination of ambiguity in light of the missing terms.
Id. at ^1 14. The contract at issue was not indefinite as a matter of law, but was only
determined to be indefinite after the district court made a finding of ambiguity and
conducted a trial. See generally Vii. Thus, summary judgment that a contract is indefinite is
only appropriate when no reasonable trier of fact could make a finding of ambiguity. To the
extent that this Court finds any ambiguity in the terms of the warranty, it must affirm the
denial of summary judgment.
Advanced Shoring's warranty is not indefinite as was the lease agreement in Gold's
Gym, where the Court first found ambiguity, and then determined indefiniteness after full
trial. The record on summary judgment demonstrates that the Hones bought a warranty
from Advanced Shoring and that Advanced Shoring agreed to take responsibility if it could
not fix the home and keep it from sinking. The record further reflects that Advanced
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Shoring failed to fix the home. To the extent that any terms are missing to complete the
warranty it is, at worst, ambiguous rather than indefinite, and subject to interpretation by the
trier of fact. It would be particularly difficult for the Court to hold that the warranty is
indefinite as a matter of law, and that no reasonable trier of fact could find that the warranty
is ambiguous, when Advanced Shoring admits to making the statement, "I won't guarantee
it unless I get $10,000 more."
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Hones request the Court to affirm the Trial
Court's denial of each of Advanced Shoring's summary judgment motions and the denial of
Advanced Shoring's motion for directed verdict.
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ADDENDUM "A"
Illustrative photographs of damage to the Hones' home.
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